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1. Introduction 
 
The fact that financial markets move more closely together during times of crisis is well 
documented. Conditional correlations between assets are much higher when market returns are 
low in periods of financial stress (see King and Wadhwani, 1990; and Ang, Chen and Xing, 
2006). Co-movements typically arise from common exposures to shocks, but also from the 
propagation of distress associated with a decline in the market value of assets held by individual 
institutions, a phenomenon we dub ‘balance sheet contraction’ and which is of particular concern 
in the financial industry. The recent crisis has shown how the failure of large individual credit 
institutions can have dramatic effects on the overall financial system and, eventually, spread to 
the real economy. As a result, international financial policy institutions are currently designing a 
new regulatory framework for the so-called systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
in order to ensure global financial stability and prevent, or at least mitigate, future episodes of 
systemic contagion.1 
 
In this paper, we analyze the main determinants of systemic contagion from an individual 
institution to the international financial system, i.e., the empirical drivers of tail-risk 
interdependence. We examine a sample of large international banks that are the target of current 
regulatory efforts and that would likely be considered too-big-to-fail by central banks. These 
banks are characterized by their large capitalization, global activity, cross-border exposures 
and/or representative size in the local industry. Using data spanning 2001–2009, we explicitly 
                                                 
1 A rapidly growing literature discusses how contagion can occur through spikes in counterparty risk within a 
network of credit-interdependent institutions or through fire sales of securities (Adrian and Shin, 2010; IMF, 2010). 
Section 2 in this paper offers a survey of the literature in this field. 
3 
 
measure the contribution of the balance sheet contraction of these institutions to international 
financial distress. As regulators seek for meaningful measures of interconnectedness (Walter, 
2011), this paper contributes to the current debate on prudential regulatory requirements.  
 
Our study builds on the novel procedure put forward by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), the so-
called CoVaR methodology, and generalizes it in several ways in order to deal with the 
characteristics of a sample of 54 international banks and to address the asymmetric patterns that 
may underlie tail dependence. The main empirical findings of our analysis can be summarized as 
follows:  
 
First, we find that short-term wholesale funding is the most reliable balance sheet determinant of 
a bank’s contribution to global systemic risk. Financial institutions use short-term wholesale 
funding to supplement retail deposits and expand their balance sheets. These funds are typically 
raised on a short-term rollover basis with instruments such as large-denomination certificates of 
deposit, brokered deposits, central bank funds, commercial paper and repurchase agreements. 
Whereas it is agreed that wholesale funding provides certain managerial advantages (see Huang 
and Ratnovski, 2011, for a discussion), the effects on systemic risk of an overreliance on these 
liabilities were under-recognized prior to the recent financial crisis. Banks with excessive short-
term funding ratios are typically more interconnected to other banks, exposed to a high degree of 
maturity mismatch, and more vulnerable to market conditions and liquidity risk. These features 
can critically increase the vulnerability not only of interbank markets and money market mutual 
funds, which act as wholesale providers of liquidity, but eventually of the whole financial 
system.  
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According to our analysis, an increase of one percentage point in short-term wholesale funding 
leads to an increase in the contribution to systemic risk of 16 basis points for quarterly asset 
returns at the 1-quarter horizon and 43 basis points at the 1-year horizon. These results support 
current regulatory initiatives aimed at increasing bank liquidity buffers to lessen asset-liability 
maturity mismatches as a mechanism to mitigate individual liquidity risk, such as the liquidity 
coverage ratio recently laid out by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision under the new 
Basel III regulatory framework.2 This paper shows that these initiatives may also help to reduce 
the likelihood of systemic contagion. In contrast to the role played by short-term wholesale 
funding, we find weaker evidence that either size or leverage is helpful in predicting future 
systemic risk within our set of large international banks. Consequently, the empirical analysis in 
this paper provides clear evidence of the major role played by short-term wholesale funding in 
the spreading of systemic risk in global markets. 
 
Second, our analysis reveals a strong degree of asymmetric response that has not been discussed 
in the existing literature on systemic risk. We examine the asymmetric sensitivity of the system 
to an individual bank based on the sign of bank returns. A distressed systemic institution is likely 
to have greater spillover effects on the rest of the financial system when its balance sheet is 
contracting, and therefore an empirical analysis of tail risk-dependence within a financial system 
should distinguish between episodes of expanding and contracting balance sheets. Our results 
show that individual balance sheet contraction produces a significant negative spillover on the 
                                                 
2 This ratio will require banks to maintain sufficient liquid assets to contain a 100% run-off of unsecured wholesale 
funding provided by financial institutions during a 30-day stress scenario, which contrasts with the 5 to 10% run-off 
assumed for retail deposits during a significant liquidity stress episode. 
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Value-at-Risk (VaR) threshold of the global index. Whereas the sensitivity of left tail global 
returns to a shock in an institution’s market valued asset returns is on average about 0.3, the 
elasticity conditional on an institution having a shrinking balance sheet is more than two times 
larger. Therefore, controlling for balance sheet contraction is crucial in order to rank financial 
institutions by their contribution to systemic risk.  
 
Third, we find evidence that the banks that received prompt recapitalization in Q4 2008 were 
able to improve their relative position during the crisis period. In contrast, the banks that were 
rescued by public authorities later in Q4 2009 became relatively more systemic during the crisis 
period. In other words, the ripple effects from their individual distress were more widespread 
throughout the financial system. This conclusion is based on the results showing that the credit 
crisis added 0.1 percentage points to the co-movement between individual and global asset 
returns, while recapitalization during the crisis period dampened co-movement by 0.14 
percentage points. Consequently, the timing of recapitalization is also important for systemic 
risk.  
 
Finally, our paper highlights the relevance of crisis episodes in measuring systemic risk and of 
the response policy actions. Our results show that the marginal contribution of an individual 
bank’s financial distress to the 1st percentile of the system returns increases from 1 percent in an 
average quarter between 2001 and 2009 to 1.4 percent in a quarter characterized by money 
market turbulence at the height of the global financial crisis during Q3 2007–Q1 2009.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the most representative 
literature on systemic risk, highlighting the differential features of the CoVaR approach. Section 
3 discusses the data employed in the two stages of our analysis. Section 4 lays out our CoVaR 
estimation framework and shows the estimates of individual contributions to systemic risk. 
Section 5 analyzes the determinants of systemic risk and reports the results of several robustness 
checks. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our main findings and concludes with policy 
recommendations. 
 
2. Related literature and choice of methodology 
 
Our study builds on the CoVaR methodology proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), 
which allows us to generate time-varying estimates of the systemic risk contribution for each 
bank in our sample. This methodology has been applied in a number of recent studies (e.g. Van 
Oordt and Zhou, 2010; Roengiptya and Rungcharoenkitkul, 2011). Our study provides two main 
contributions with respect to these studies. First, we focus on an international sample of large 
banks. These banks are particularly important from a regulatory perspective. Second, we extend 
the basic CoVaR methodology to account for a number of econometric issues related to 
asymmetric responses, recapitalization effects and structural changes that originated during the 
global financial crisis.  
 
There exists a growing literature that has suggested several alternative approaches to address the 
existence of systemic interrelations using different procedures and variables. Lehar (2005) 
characterizes the conditional correlations between banks and asset portfolios using default 
probabilities of financial institutions as a measure of systemic risk. Goodhart and Segoviano 
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(2009) construct a banking stability index to estimate interbank dependence for tail events using 
credit default swap data. Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) propose a measure of systemic risk based 
on the price of insuring a pool of banks against financial distress based on ex ante measures of 
default probabilities of individual banks and forecasts of asset return correlations. More recently, 
Acharya et al. (2010) define the systemic expected shortfall as the propensity of a financial 
institution to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized. This is a 
measure of the exposure of banks to systemic tail events, which nevertheless can easily be 
reverted to capture risk contribution (see Section 5 for more details). Brownlees and Engle 
(2011) they construct short- and long-run MES forecasts propose the SRISK index, which 
captures the expected capital shortage of a firm given its degree of leverage and Marginal 
Expected Shortfall (MES). Alternatively, De Nicolo and Lucchetta (2010) use a dynamic factor 
to model quarterly time series of macroeconomic indicators of financial and real activity and 
obtain forecasts of systemic real risk and systemic financial risk. Gray and Jobst (2010) examine 
contagion across markets and institutions using extreme value theory, while Kritzman et al. 
(2010) introduce the so-called absorption ratio measure to assess systemic risk using a principal 
components approach; see also Billio, et al. (2010) for a related analysis.  
 
As an alternative to systemic risk measures based on the marginal risk contributions of individual 
institutions, network analysis is concerned with the joint distribution of losses of all market 
participants. Cont et al. (2009) and Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2010) have analyzed the Brazilian 
and Mexican interbank markets, respectively, using this approach. Cao (2010) shows how to use 
Shapley values to decompose the system-wide risk among the individual institutions in a CoVaR 
setting (see also Tarashev et al., 2010). A very comprehensive survey of the main systemic risk 
8 
 
measures and analytical frameworks developed over the past several years is contained in Bisias 
et al. (2012). All of these procedures have both methodological advantages and shortcomings 
relative to other methods, so there is no such a thing as an optimal procedure in the literature 
with which to measure systemic risk.  
 
The particular choice of the CoVaR methodology as a tool to characterize systemic risk in this 
paper is largely motivated by three considerations. First, this procedure is particularly appealing 
because it allows us to characterize contagion under balance sheet deleveraging, which is a main 
regulatory concern and a key driver of this paper. In contrast, most of the alternative measures 
omit balance sheet data as they are naturally intended for stock market return data and/or default-
related data, as surveyed previously. Second, the CoVaR methodology is extremely informative 
about the dynamics followed by the systemic contribution of a particular bank to the system, 
which allows us to characterize the effects of different observable variables on the time-series 
dynamics of this latent process. In particular, the CoVaR can easily control for relevant features 
of the data, such as the occurrence of a crisis or a bank recapitalization, and allows us to use both 
historical-based and forward-looking state variables to improve downside risk forecasts. Finally, 
this setting can be generalized straightforwardly to accommodate non-linear patterns and other 
relevant effects that likely characterize the contribution of a large bank to the global system and 
which have not been discussed in the existing literature. Indeed, an additional contribution of our 
study to the literature is to show that the marginal effects of individual banks on the global 
system are both economically and statistically very different in good and bad times.   
 
3. Data 
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Given the adverse effect on global financial stability from the failure of a large financial 
institution, with the recent crisis providing ample evidence of cross-country ripple effects, we 
define the financial system as a network of large, internationally active banking institutions that 
are the target of current regulatory efforts and that may be considered too-big-to-fail by central 
banks. Concerning the perimeter of the financial system, we restrict the analysis to the regulated 
banking sector to exclude the unobservable impact of different regulatory frameworks across 
financial industries.  
 
These features configure the total population universe in our analysis. In order to construct a 
representative sample, we focus on banks characterized by their large capitalization, global 
activity, cross-border exposures and/or representative size in the local industry. Since our 
methodological approach is based on a two-stage procedure that requires both stock market data 
and firm-specific balance sheet variables (see Sections 4 and 5 for details), the ultimate criterion 
to configure our sample of potentially systemic banks is the availability of comparable data over 
a long enough period of time.3 The resulting sample is formed by a total of 54 large firms from 
18 countries, starting in July 2001 and ending in December 2009.4 All the variables used in the 
paper are measured in United States dollars (USD).5 Appendix A lists these banks. 
                                                 
3 The initial sample consisted of the 200 largest banks as of 2008. We then restricted our sample to listed 
consolidated banks, yielding a total of 93 banks.  Qualitative information about the financial markets where they 
operate, together with data limitations, namely the lack of quarterly or semi-annual balance sheet data during the 
sample period, constrained our final sample to 54 banks. The average size of the representative bank is USD 862 
billion and accounts for 54.6 percent of domestic GDP. 
4 Among others, the final sample includes 22 out of the 29 banks identified as global SIFIs by the Financial Stability 
Board in November, 2011. 
5 The shortage of USD liquidity in global markets during the financial crisis triggered sharp depreciations of most 
currencies against the U.S. dollar in Q3 2008. To exclude the impact of exchange rate fluctuations from bank 
performance, we conduct a robustness check of the results in USD by applying the CoVaR methodology on market 
valued asset returns denominated in local currency (see Section 5.2 for further robustness checks.) Results remain 
unaltered and are available upon request to the authors. 
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In the first stage of our analysis, we characterize the time-varying conditional VaR dynamics of 
both individual banks and the global system (see Section 4.1 for details). The time-series 
parametric estimation of these processes is enhanced by using a set of macro-financial state 
variables that are acknowledged to capture the expected return in financial markets. We use the 
set of state variables sampled from the U.S. market as common conditioning variables. This 
approach also seems reasonable because of the strong degree of globalization in the financial 
industry and the predominance of the U.S. economy. 
 
The U.S. state variables used in this analysis are the Volatility Index (VIX) of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE); liquidity spread (difference between the 3-month U.S. repo rate and 
the 3-month U.S. T-bill yield); the change in the U.S. Treasury bill secondary market 3-month 
rate; the change in the slope of the yield curve (yield spread between the U.S. Treasury 
benchmark 10-year bonds and the U.S. 3-month T-bill); the change in the credit spread between 
the 10-year Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond and the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond; and the 
S&P 500 Composite Index return. All these variables are sampled weekly. The data have been 
obtained from the CBOE, the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 Release, and the Datastream 
databases. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the U.S. predictive variables. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
In the second stage of our analysis, we identify the empirical drivers of our estimates of systemic 
risk using bank-specific balance-sheet data. We gather quarterly or semi-annual data (depending 
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on the reporting frequency in each country) from Bloomberg to construct meaningful measures 
of leverage, market-to-book ratio, short-term wholesale funding, relative size, and marketable 
securities (see Section 5 for further details). Since several banks were recapitalized over the 
sample period, we included dummy variables to capture the specific timing of these events. 
Appendix B provides detailed information on the extent and timing of these recapitalizations.  
 
4. Modelling and forecasting global CoVaR dynamics 
 
In the following subsections, we describe the features involved in the first stage involved in the 
CoVaR analysis and discuss the main estimation results.  
 
4.1. Estimation methodology 
VaR is the most common procedure to measure portfolio downside risk in practice. For a certain 
probability  0,1 ,  the % VaR of a portfolio is defined as the maximum loss over a horizon of 
h days, which is expected at the  1 %  confidence level given the set of observable information, 
i.e., the λ-quantile of the conditional loss distribution.6 This statistical measure has been largely 
popularized by the present regulatory risk-management framework, as it allows sophisticated 
banks and other financial institutions to use internal VaR models to set capital requirements. 
Because the main interest in systemic risk derives from regulatory considerations, it seems 
natural to consider risk measures that attempt to capture the extent of systemic risk using the 
same methodological approach.  
                                                 
6 When reporting downside risk statistics, such as VaR, it is customary to present the outcomes in positive values 
(i.e., -VaR) since it is implicitly understood that these refer to a loss. In this paper, we maintain the original sign of 
the conditional quantile in all the downside risk measures described through the following subsections: VaR, CoVaR 
and ΔCoVaR. 
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Paralleling the VaR definition, the CoVaR is defined as the maximum loss to be expected in a 
certain portfolio (e.g., an individual bank or, more generally, a portfolio representative of the 
whole financial system) for a given confidence level and time horizon, given the maximum loss 
expected in another portfolio at a specific confidence level and time horizon. More formally, 
the % CoVaR of portfolio j given the conditioning event  itX  of portfolio i, is defined as the 
  quantile of the conditional loss function:
                                  
 
                                 
   ,Pr itj Xj it t tX CoVaR X                                                        (1) 
where jtX and itX denote the respective portfolio returns.7 Given this measure, Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) propose to approach the portfolio i’s contribution to j’s systemic risk as: 
                            , , ,
i i i i
t tj X VaR j X Mediani
t t tCoVaR CoVaR CoVaR

  
                                      (2) 
This captures the amount of additional risk that a certain firm inflicts upon the financial system 
when this firm is in distress (when it reaches its VaR) rather than conditional on its median level 
of returns. In our baseline analysis, we shall consider portfolio returns over a weekly horizon and 
focus on the 1% quantile of the conditional loss distribution.  
 
Our main interest is to capture the contribution of an individual bank to a portfolio representative 
of the surrounding system, formed by the remaining banks. The details of the main steps 
involved in the application of this analysis are outlined in the following subsections.  
                                                 
7 In a recent study, Girardi and Ergun (2011) propose a multivariate GARCH model to estimate the dynamics of 
CoVaR under the conditioning event Xt ≤ VaRt. Their analysis shows that the effect of individual institution 
characteristics (e.g., VaR, size, leverage, etc.) on the resulting ΔCoVaR does not differ significantly from that 
reported under the “standard” CoVaR analysis conditioned on X=VaR. This suggests that conditioning the CoVaR 
measure on X=VaR rather than on X<VaR may not imply a drastic loss of generality, yet it considerably simplifies 
the methodolocial analysis and, more importantly, makes it robust to distributional assumptions. 
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4.1.1. Individual banks 
For each bank, we consider weekly returns from a portfolio formed by the market-valued total 
assets of the firm. Our interest in this particular portfolio is entirely motivated by a regulatory 
perspective, since balance sheet contraction is associated with negative spillovers that may 
trigger financial sector instability. In order to construct weekly returns, it should be noted that, 
whereas market equity data are available at weekly frequency, balance sheet data are usually 
reported on a quarterly basis, and even on a lower frequency for several banks in our sample 
(e.g., banks in Australia, Belgium, France, Ireland, UK and South Africa report on a semi-annual 
basis).  
 
We adopt two different strategies to circumvent the sampling frequency mismatch problem 
involved. As in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), we assume that the leverage ratio remains 
(approximately) constant throughout successive weeks within any given quarter/semester, 
thereby approaching the unobservable weekly value with the low-frequency data available in the 
period. Alternatively, to avoid the seasonal discontinuities that this method may create, we 
smooth weekly the quarterly/biannual leverage ratio through cubic spline interpolation, a well-
known technique in applied finance (e.g., it is routinely used to construct the term structure) and 
other disciplines. Because the final results are not sensitive to this consideration, we present and 
discuss the main outcomes from the constant approach, noting that complete results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
 
4.1.2. Global System Portfolio(s) 
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For each bank in the sample, we construct a (different) global system portfolio as a weighted 
average of the returns of the remaining banks in the sample. Thus, the returns of the 
representative global system portfolio for institution i are characterized according to: 
                                 



n
ijj
j
ttj
iS
t XX
,1
,
,  , 
1
.1
,

 




 n
ijj
j
t
j
ttj WW                                       (3) 
where jtX refers to the simple returns of the j-th institution and 
j
tW  is some (strictly positive) 
variable used in the weighting scheme such that the resultant weights satisfy the 
restriction 10 ,  tj . Some comments on this approach follow.  
 
First, each of the resulting indices is a portfolio of large-scale complex banks and, consequently, 
represents a systemic portfolio that allows us to study how a shock in a stressed bank spills over 
in the class of financial assets that poses the highest risk to the global financial system. We shall 
now refer to the resulting portfolios as global system portfolios.  
 
Second, the most distinctive feature of this approach is that global system portfolios are 
computed after excluding the bank under analysis. This procedure ensures a small-sample 
adjustment that prevents a mechanical correlation effect (i.e., a spurious interdependence) 
between the bank and the system not only when the total number of institutions n in the sample is 
not particularly large, but also when a single institution has a significant weight in relation to the 
whole system even if n is fairly large.8 Because the bank under analysis is not included, the 
                                                 
8 In our particular case, the sample is formed by 54 banks, which makes the returns of a common global system 
formed by all banks fairly sensitive to the largest firms. More generally, the refinement proposed may still be 
advisable even in large samples because a single bank (or a small set of banks) may still drive the dynamics of a 
common system portfolio. To illustrate this point we have computed the total assets of all listed bank holding 
companies and commercial banks in the U.S. at Q4 2010 using data from the Bank Regulatory Database and CRSP. 
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subsequent analysis of tail co-movements between this bank and the resulting system is much 
more rigorous and necessarily rules out the possibility of spurious interrelations stemming from 
the simultaneous presence of the same firm in both portfolios.  
 
Finally, we consider two different weighting variables to define the global system portfolios in 
(3). Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), we use the lagged value of the total assets 
variable. Alternatively, we use (the lagged book value of a bank’s liabilities. Whereas interest in 
the former is motivated by the belief that relatively larger banks may impose larger shocks to the 
supply of credit, the latter may capture more accurately the extent of interconnectedness between 
financial institutions under certain circumstances.9 We report the results using total assets as the 
weighting variable.10 
 
4.1.3. Estimating VaR of individual banks and system portfolios 
The CoVaR methodology requires the estimation of the VaR for any individual bank and any 
system portfolio in our sample. To this end, we consider the Quantile Regression methodology 
(QR henceforth). The focus on the 1% quantile conforms to a standard measure of market risk 
used by financial institutions and regulatory authorities to compute capital requirements. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Among the 277 firms involved, the largest bank in terms of total assets in this period was Bank of America. This 
bank represents approximately 19.9% of the banking sector. Obviously, if we analyze dependences between this 
particular bank and a portfolio formed by the 277 banks, the results would likely support the existence of 
interdependences because of the massive presence of Bank of America in both portfolios. Our simple adjustment 
rules out the possibility of overstating tail dependence. 
9 To underline why liabilities may be better intended as weighting variables than total assets, consider the following 
example. Assume that a systemic bank has financed most of its assets by issuing debt. Suppose that, following an 
episode of financial distress, total assets are marked down in value. Using total assets as a weighting variable would 
underestimate the importance of the bank in the financial system. While the size of the firm may have declined, the 
initial value of its outstanding claims and, thus, its potential for spillover effects on its financial counterparts, would 
remain unaltered. 
10 Results using book value of liabilities remain the same and are available upon request. 
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Let  1 ,...,t ktZ Z   be a vector with the observations at time t of the macroeconomic and financial 
state variables described in Section 3, and let Dt be a dummy variable taking the value of one in 
the crisis period (after September 2008) and zero otherwise. Then, given the set of variables 
 11, , ,...,t t t ktZ D Z Z   we run a predictive QR model to capture the 1% VaR dynamics, 
                  
'
1 , ; 1,...,t t
i
t u t TY Z                                                      (4) 
 
with  , , ,S i it tit X XY   and the error term ,tu  satisfying the usual restriction  , 1 0,t tQ u Z    where 
 , 1t tQ u Z   is the conditional quantile of the error term. This general specification does not 
impose any particular restriction on the distribution of the data, and parameters can be estimated 
consistently upon mild regularity conditions. The quantile regression in VaR modelling 
specification has been used by Engle and Manganelli (2004), among others. 
 
Although we do not report here the estimates from the QR estimation of the VaR processes 
(results are available upon request), some features are worth commenting upon. First, the market 
volatility index has a strong and negative effect on the size of the expected VaR, with increases 
in volatility levels triggering larger than expected losses. Not surprisingly, among all the 
predictive variables analyzed, market volatility turns out to be the best predictor. Second, 
changes in the T-bill rate, a widening of liquidity spreads, and spikes in credit spreads are 
generally found to be significantly associated with a larger one-period ahead VaR and, hence, 
could be used to anticipate higher levels of downside risk. Third, the dummy variable related to 
the financial crisis shows a structural impact on the unconditional level of the inferred VaR 
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dynamics, and helps to improve the overall fit of the model. Generally speaking, the goodness of 
fit, as measured by the pseudo-R2, shows a strong degree of predictability in terms of the 
conditioning variables used in the analysis, particularly, of the volatility index. 
 
4.1.4. Computing |,S itCoVaR  and ,
i
tCoVaR  
The key step in the CoVaR methodology is to estimate the measure of conditional co-movement. 
This is readily achieved by augmenting the quantile regression model (4) with the returns of the 
i-th bank and by setting ,S itit XY  . Building on this approach, in this paper we consider several 
econometric specifications of increasing complexity, which extend the basic CoVaR model. 
More specifically, our baseline specification is the same model used by Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011), namely: 
 
                                              
'
1 , ,
, i
t i t t
S i
t X uX Z                                                          (5) 
 
for which the contribution of institution i to its portfolio system can be approached as  
 
                                  %50ˆ ,, titiii t VaRVaRCoVaR                                             (6) 
 
In this expression, the existence of risk spillovers is captured through the estimates of the δλ,i 
parameter: for non-zero values of this parameter, the left tail of the system distribution can be 
predicted by observing the predetermined distribution of a bank’s returns.  
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Because the CoVaR is essentially a measure of downside risk, there are certain caveats in the 
basic specification of model (5) and its resulting predictions, given by (6). In particular, the 
estimates of δλ,i reflect the average response of the conditional distribution of the global system 
returns to the whole distribution of the returns of a bank. Since the interest of our analysis is 
clearly on the behavior of the left tail, for which 1% VaR is expected to be a negative value, the 
basic specification (5) neglects an important feature of the conditioning: the final prediction is 
constructed on a negative value. If we factor in the reinforcing effects from credit constraints in a 
downward market, the model is likely to yield parameter estimates of δλ,i which can significantly 
underestimate the impact on the system of a negative shock in the balance sheet of a bank. We 
therefore propose a simple, yet meaningful extension that accounts for the possible asymmetries 
in the specification (henceforth referred to as Asymmetric CoVaR),  
 
                                       
'
1 , , ,0 0
,
i i
t t
i i
t i t i t tX X
S i
t X I X I uX Z                                             (7) 
 
where  I  is an indicator function taking a value equal to one if the condition in the subscript is 
true and zero otherwise (see López-Espinosa et al. (2012) for further details). The baseline model 
trivially arises as a particular case under the restriction , , ,i i i        . In turn, the asymmetric 
model delivers one-period ahead forecasts of the contribution to the CoVaR given by 
                                      %50ˆˆ ,,, tiitiii t VaRVaRCoVaR                                      (8) 
 
and should generally be expected to generate more precise estimates of systemic risk than those 
based on the restricted model (6), at least if , ,i i      holds true. 
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In addition, since most banks in our sample underwent a recapitalization process as an 
endogenous policy response to large losses incurred during the financial crisis, we account for 
the impact on returns from the crisis period as well as from the recapitalization process as 
follows: 
                 
'
1 , , , , ,0 0 0, 0,Re
,
i i i i
t t t t
i i i i
t i t i t i t i t tX X X Crisis X
S i
t X I X I X I X I uX Z                                     (9) 
 
where  0,itX CrisisI   and  0,ReitXI  take a value equal to one, for negative returns observed in the crisis 
period and on the bank recapitalization date, respectively.  
 
4.2. Estimation results 
 
The main results from the QR estimation of models (5), (7) and (9) are discussed in this 
subsection. Recall that estimations are carried out for two different datasets. We consider all 54 
banks and use U.S. state variables as predictors of expected return. This is termed as “1-Region” 
in our analysis. Table 2 displays median results for equations (5), (7) and (9) under the “1-
Region” specification. The table shows the median of the coefficient estimates, the median of the 
t-statistics for the individual significance of the estimated coefficients, and the median of the 
pseudo-R2. We also considered a “2-Region” specification with U.S. + Canada as one region and 
Europe as the second. While we do not report the results here, they are robust. Complete results 
for both the “2-Region” specification and banks at the individual level are available upon 
request. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
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A remarkably robust picture emerges from the analysis across different estimations. Among the 
different state variables used as controlling variables, market volatility and market return exhibit 
the strongest predictive power in statistical terms. The significance of the remaining variables is 
much more sensitive to the specification of the model. The coefficient related to the dynamics of 
the lagged returns of a potentially systemic bank is always significant in our analysis and 
enhances the ability of the model to forecast the tail performance of the global system portfolio.  
 
The overall evidence reveals the importance of globalization in the banking industry as it shows 
strong evidence of interconnectedness among large-scale banks, even if they belong to different 
countries and different economic regions.  
 
Allowing for asymmetric effects in the characteristic response of the VaR of the system portfolio 
to the returns of a particular bank leads to considerable enhancement in the overall fit of the 
model as measured by the pseudo-R2. Interestingly, the predictive power of the liquidity spread 
becomes insignificant, which implies that this variable was essentially required to explain non-
linear patterns. More importantly, we observe the dramatic effect that neglecting asymmetric 
responses has on the estimated value of the CoVaR coefficient. A model that assumes a 
symmetric response tends to largely underestimate the size of the link between the bank and its 
system portfolio and, hence, leads to conservative predictions of the extent of systemic risk. Note 
that, according to our estimates, the median of the estimates of the coefficient ,i is more than 
two times larger than the coefficient under the symmetric model.  
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On average, allowing for time-effects related to the crisis seems to lead to moderate incremental 
gains over the asymmetric specification, although we note that there exist considerable degrees 
of heterogeneity in the results that make it difficult to draw a clear conclusion. In general terms, 
global returns become more sensitive to negative bank returns during global financial crises. 
Similarly, on average, the impact of negative bank returns on system returns tends to decrease 
after a capital injection, indicating the success of recapitalization programs in containing 
systemic risk. 
 
[Insert Table 3a around here] 
 
Table 3a displays the systemic risk contribution of each bank, ranking banks based on the size of 
the asymmetric sensitivity of the system to negative bank returns. We also show the other 
sensitivity coefficients, including dummy variables multiplied by negative returns. The table 
shows that banks such as Bank of America, HSBC and Lloyds were among the most systemic 
under the lens of our asymmetric beta coefficient. Asymmetries are also very noticeable. For 
instance, for Bank of America the coefficient on negative returns is more than 5 times larger than 
the coefficient on positive returns, whereas for HSBC, it is more than10 times larger. 
Interestingly, the higher the coefficient on bank negative returns, the more asymmetric is its 
contribution to overall systemic risk. Figure 1 plots the difference between the median estimates 
of the coefficient on negative returns and that on positive returns as a function of the ranking of 
each bank listed in Table 3a. The figure reveals a strong relation between the position in this 
ranking and the size of the asymmetry: the higher the sensitivity of system returns to the negative 
returns of a bank, the more asymmetric is this bank. This again reinforces the need to account for 
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asymmetries when performing systemic risk regressions. Table 3a also shows that some banks 
tend to impact global returns more during crises, while for other banks the opposite is true. For 
instance, two specific Canadian banks – Bank of Montreal and Toronto-Dominion Bank – 
impacted system returns heavily during the crisis.  
 
Finally, we see that recapitalizations had a very positive effect for three US banks – PNC, Wells 
Fargo, and Citibank – and for several European institutions, such as BNP, Unicredit, BMPS, 
Barclays, and Lloyds. This suggests that early government intervention helped mitigate systemic 
risk.  
 
 
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 3b around here] 
 
Table 3b shows the ranking of banks based on their contribution to overall systemic risk based 
directly on the average ΔCoVaR measure. It does so for the whole period as well as for the pre-
crisis and crisis periods. On average across banks, contributions are almost 0.9 percentage points 
higher during the crisis period, relative to the pre-crisis period. Interestingly, the ranking of an 
institution in the crisis period is influenced by the timing of public intervention in that bank. For 
instance, some banks that received prompt recapitalization in Q4 2008, such as Citigroup, Bank 
of America and ING, improved their relative position during the crisis period. 
 
[Insert Tables 3c and 3d around here] 
 
23 
 
In order to draw cross-country comparisons of systemic risk contributions, Table 3c shows the 
sensitivity parameter estimates of the first-stage regressions across countries, whereas Table 3d 
shows the implied cross-country ΔCoVaR metric before the crisis, during the crisis, and for the 
whole period. Both tables reveal that the system is most sensitive to Dutch banks in distress. This 
is essentially due to the large effect of ING on the system, especially before the crisis. 
Interestingly, Table 3c shows that recapitalizations engineered by governments of major 
countries reduced systemic risk in their banking system, especially in Italy, the US and the UK. 
 
5. Determinants of systemic risk 
 
5.1 Regression analysis 
 
In this section, we discuss the main drivers of systemic risk in global banking. We aggregate the 
estimates of the weekly ΔCoVaRit processes obtained in Section 4 to quarterly frequency and 
relate them to a set of bank-specific variables in panel data and pooled regressions. In particular, 
we consider the following baseline predictive regression model with fixed effects: 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1
6 7
1 1
it it k it k it k it k it k
n m
it k it k j j it
j j
CoVaR CoVaR VaR Leverage WSF Size
MTB Mktb Bank Time
     
  
    
 
 
 
        
    
(10)
 
 
with ΔCoVaRit computed from the first stage as described above and VaRit denoting the quarterly 
estimates of VaR. We include lags of these variables to correct for endogenous risk persistence. 
In addition, the right-hand side of (10) includes the following predictive variables: 
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- Leverageit-k is the total assets to equity ratio of bank i at quarter t-k (where k can be 1, 4 or 
8 quarters). This ratio is a usual a proxy for the level of solvency of the bank, and so the 
higher the leverage the lower the solvency. Therefore, we expect a negative relation with 
the dependent variable. 
- WSFit-k approaches the relative level of short-term wholesale funding as the total short-
term borrowings to total assets ratio of bank i at quarter t-k (k=1, 4, 8 quarters). Short-
term borrowings include bank overdrafts, short-term debt and borrowing, repo, short-term 
portion of long-term borrowing due to other banks (including to the central bank) or any 
other financial institutions, call money, discounted bills, purchased federal funds and 
securities sold but not yet purchased. This ratio is a proxy for interconnectivity among 
financial institutions and captures liquidity risk exposures. Hence, we expect a negative 
relation with ΔCoVaRit. 
- Sizeit-k is the total assets of bank i at quarter t-k (k=1, 4, 8 quarters) over the total assets of 
all banks in the sample at quarter t-k. We expect that the larger the relative size of a bank, 
the higher its contribution to systemic risk. 
- MTBit-k is the market-to-book ratio of bank i at quarter t-k (k=1, 4, 8 quarters). This ratio 
may proxy growth opportunities, but under potential mispricing, it could also capture 
systemic risk due to expected market value realignment. Thus a higher value of this ratio 
would imply a negative relationship with ΔCoVaRit.  
- Mktbit-1 is the marketable securities to total assets ratio of bank i at quarter t-k (k=1, 4, 8 
quarters). It is a proxy for the proportion of financial instruments that account for fair 
value. Similarly to wholesale funding, we expect a negative relation with the dependent 
variable due to reinforcing effects from the fire sale of distressed assets. 
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- Bankj and Timej are bank and time dummies to control for individual fixed bank and time 
effects, respectively. 
 
Table 4 reports the estimates from equation (10) for asset-weighted global systems, after 
controlling for bank and time fixed effects and, additionally, allowing for bank clustered errors. 
We show three specifications depending on the forecast horizon of systemic risk predictors: 1 
quarter, 1 and 2 years. Across forecast horizons, wholesale funding appears as the most robust 
determinant of systemic risk, suggesting that banks that are heavily dependent on short-term 
borrowing contribute decisively to higher systemic risk, thus generating negative externalities. 
Similar results have been found in Acharya et al. (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). 
Size also appears significant at the 1-year horizon across econometric specifications, whereas 
marketable securities appear significant in the 2-year specification at the 10% significance level 
in the panel data specification. In contrast to these papers, we find that leverage and book to 
market are never significant at any of the standard confidence levels, implying that these firm 
characteristics do not add additional information over short-term wholesale funding. This 
evidence supports the theoretical claims in Zhou (2010), who argues that being too big is not 
necessarily a systemic driver, but rather it is the excessive risk-taking behavior of “too big to 
fail” institutions, which may be triggered by the anticipation of future bail-out policies. Our 
paper suggests that riskier funding is a key contributor to systemic risk. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
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There are, at least, two interrelated reasons that explain why short-term wholesale funding plays 
such a fundamental role in contributing to systemic risk in the global banking industry. First, 
banks usually raise short-term wholesale funding in the interbank unsecured market, where 
banks can handle liquidity needs by borrowing and lending money from their peers in over-the-
counter operations. This market provides a direct channel for financial contagion, because a bank 
that intensively operates in this segment interconnects its balance sheet with those of other 
financial intermediaries around the world, thereby increasing the likelihood of a global domino 
fall in the industry. The extent of wholesale funding is, therefore, a natural proxy for 
interconnectedness, a factor that the Financial Stability Board pointed out early on as being a key 
determinant of systemic importance.  
 
Second, a bank that relies excessively on short-term funding has greater maturity mismatch 
between assets and liabilities and becomes more vulnerable to liquidity risk. This feature makes 
the possibility of fire sales more likely and causes risk externalities to other intermediaries 
holding the same asset classes; see, among others, Brunnermeier (2009), Ratnovski (2009), 
Acharya and Merrouche (2010), and Allen et al. (2010). Consequently, short-term wholesale 
funding is also strongly related to liquidity risk, a major source of systemic disruption during the 
financial crisis. The confluence of these two channels makes short-term wholesale funding a 
critical variable in understanding the degree of systemic importance of a bank. 
 
Our analysis employs the CoVaR methodology developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
but our empirical application departs importantly from theirs, as it focuses on a sample of large 
global banks, whereas they focus on a wider set of U.S. institutions, including also other types of 
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companies, such as broker-dealers, real estate institutions and insurance companies. Given that 
our sample is international, we can assess the differential features of the systemic risk channels 
between banks in the two largest monetary areas in our sample, U.S. / E.M.U. (United States / 
European Monetary Union), and in the rest of the world. To do so, we enlarge our set of 
explanatory variables of the previous table and include the dummy variable for U.S./E.M.U. 
bank, and interact it with the most relevant state variables of the literature (size, leverage and 
wholesale funding). This new regression setting can be expressed as: 
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(11)
 
where Ci is the U.S./E.M.U. dummy.  
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
Table 5 shows results for the 1-quarter forecast horizon. Regressions with U.S. dummies show 
that short-term wholesale funding is still the most reliable systemic risk predictor for all except 
U.S. banks, as it appears statistically significant under both econometric specifications. However, 
for U.S. banks, it does not appear significant and it even has the opposite sign. Thus, U.S. banks 
behave differently to the remaining banks in our sample. In the case of the E.M.U. regressions, 
the opposite is the case, and both short-term wholesale funding and size are significant drivers of 
systemic risk only for E.M.U. banks.  As a result, and within the set of banks in our sample, a 
relevant difference emerges between U.S. and E.M.U. banks, with these latter banks exhibiting a 
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strong systemic risk channel stemming from the level of short-term wholesale funding. As our 
sample spans the early years after the creation of the euro currency, the reduction in transaction 
costs may have spurred the growth of the pool of short-term wholesale funding in the European 
interbank system, with the associated effects on systemic risk. 
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
 
We performed a battery of checks to gauge the robustness of the main conclusions in the 
previous subsection. In order to save space, these checks and their results are briefly discussed 
below, but a complete analysis is available from the authors upon request. 
 
5.2.1. Two-Regions v/s One-Region State Variables 
In the first stage of our analysis, we use the U.S. state variables as the relevant market state 
variables for all international banks. As an alternative, we also grouped most banks in our sample 
(48 out of the 54, given the exclusion of 6 banks in Asia, Africa and Australia) into two different 
economic regions, namely U.S. + Canada and Europe, for which we observe two sets of local 
predictive variables (e.g., the VIX for American banks and the Euronext Volatility Index for 
European banks).11 As a result, in the first stage, we have alternative state variables for U.S. and 
European banks. Results under the “Two-Region” specification are very similar to those reported 
above, under the U.S. (One-Region) state variables. 
 
                                                 
11In particular, the European counterparts of these variables are, respectively, the Euronext volatility index, the 
difference between the 3-month U.K. repo rate and the 3-month U.K. T-bill yield, the first difference of the French 
3-month interest rate, the first difference of the French yield slope (5-year minus 3-month) on government bonds, 
the difference between Baa corporate bonds and the 10-year German government bond, and the FTSE European 
stock index. 
29 
 
5.2.2. Characterization of individual VaR dynamics 
In the first stage, we use the QR to characterize and estimate the dynamics of VaR in individual 
banks and global system portfolios. We also consider alternative estimation procedures, namely, 
the popular parametric GARCH (1,1) applied on conditionally demeaned returns. Given the 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimates of the GARCH parameters, the VaR for each bank is then 
determined as  ˆˆ ,t Q   where  ˆQ   is the empirical λ-quantile of the distribution of the 
empirical innovations ˆ ˆ/it t tX   and ˆ t is the empirical conditional volatility process according 
to the GARCH equation. Under this estimation method, no predetermined information is used to 
capture individual VaR dynamics apart from the statistical information conveyed by the time-
series variability of itX  which offers an alternative representation. The results based on this 
approach were remarkably similar to those obtained under the QR approach. 
 
5.2.3. Measuring systemic risk 
As an alternative to ΔCoVaR, we use a measure of contribution to systemic risk in the spirit of 
the so-called Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES) proposed by Acharya et al. (2010). These 
authors measure the exposure to systemic risk of bank i as * *( | ),it it t tE r r R R   where rit and Rt 
denote the returns of an individual bank and the stock market, respectively, and *itr  and *tR  are the 
(unobservable) target values of these variables. By interchanging *it itr r  and *t tR R , the 
contribution of a bank to the market risk can be defined analogously. Thus, following Acharya et 
al. (2010), we use daily stock and market returns to approximate the unobservable SES with the 
so-called Marginal Expected Shortfall (MESit), defined as the average of global market returns 
during the 1% worst days of bank i for each bank i and each quarter t. The resulting estimates 
were regressed on lagged values of the accounting ratios defined in equation (10), finding that 
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short-term wholesale funding appears to be a significant predictor of this measure, although its 
significance is somewhat weaker in this analysis (significant at the 10% level). 
 
5.2.4. Definition of ΔCoVaR 
In a previous version of their work, Adrian and Brunnermeier define the measure of contribution 
to systemic risk as |, , ,
S ii S
t t tCoVaR CoVaR VaR     , that is, a bank’s systemic risk is measured by 
its marginal impact on system returns conditional on the bank reaching its VaR relative to the 
unconditional system returns. This measure has been used in other papers, such as Van Oordt 
and Zhou (2010). We repeated the determinants analysis of Section 5 with estimates of quarterly 
ΔCoVaR based on this definition and the main conclusions remained unaltered. 
 
5.2.5. Estimation techniques and other considerations in the determinants analysis 
In terms of estimation techniques, we also corrected standard errors in the panel data framework 
with time effects. Additionally, we estimated equation (10) and the recapitalization-extended 
model applying two-way clustering with bank and country dummies separately. Finally, we also 
performed Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, with all the independent 
variables as instruments, and the results remained unaltered.  
 
We also checked the model specification of equation (10) and included macroeconomic variables 
related to the business cycle, namely, unemployment and interest rates time series. The results 
are robust to these considerations. We also checked the robustness of the results to the model 
specification used to estimate CoVaR dynamics and the main variables involved. First, we 
computed CoVaR dynamics using a symmetric specification as that in Adrian and Brunnermeier 
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(2011). Second, we estimated the smoothed series by implementing a cubic spline on the balance 
sheet data. Third, we estimated marginal CoVaR on a global system constructed by using the 
accounting value of liabilities to compute the weights of each bank in the system. The results are 
similar, with short-term wholesale funding being the main driver of systemic risk. 
 
6. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations  
 
In this paper we examine some of the main factors driving systemic risk in a global framework. 
We focus on a set of large international institutions that would, in principle, be deemed “too big 
to fail” by financial regulators and are therefore of major interest for policy makers. For this 
class of firms, the evidence based on the CoVaR methodology indicates that short-term 
wholesale funding – a variable strongly related to interconnectedness and liquidity risk exposure 
– is positively and significantly related to systemic risk, whereas other features of the firm, such 
as leverage or relative size, seem to provide little incremental information about systemic risk. 
This suggests that short-term wholesale funding subsumes most of the relevant information on 
systemic risk conveyed by other characteristics of the firm. The fact that systemic risk can be 
predicted by balance sheet variables – short-term wholesale funding, in particular – with a 
sufficiently large forecast horizon has important policy implications, as it prompts the regulator 
to take pre-emptive action against banks with riskier positions.  
 
We also compare the relative influence of balance sheet variables on systemic risk for E.M.U. 
and U.S. banks. Our findings suggest that the short-term wholesale funding channel has been 
operating mainly through non-U.S. banks, especially via E.M.U. banks. One possible explanation 
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for this fact is that banks in the newly created monetary area had an increased pool of funding 
available due to the emergence of the euro interbank market. As a result, higher short-term 
borrowing by these institutions may have triggered an increased level of systemic risk. In future 
research, we intend to further examine these underlying international differences. 
 
Regulators are currently developing a methodological framework within the context of Basel III 
that attempts to embody the main factors of systemic importance (see Walter, 2011). These 
factors are categorized as size, interconnectedness, substitutability, global activity and 
complexity, and will serve as a major reference to determine the amount of additional capital 
requirements and funding ratios for SIFIs. Our analysis provides formal empirical support to the 
Basel Committee’s proposal to penalize excessive exposures to liquidity risk by showing that 
short-term wholesale funding, a variable capturing interconnectedness, makes a significant 
contribution to systemic risk. Furthermore, since our findings suggest that some factors are much 
more important than others in determining systemic risk contributions, an optimal capital buffer 
structure on systemic banks could, in principle, be designed by suitably weighting the different 
driving factors as a function of their relative importance. This is an interesting topic for further 
research. Similarly, the evidence in this paper also offers empirical support to justify the 
theoretical models that acknowledge the premise that short-term wholesale funding can generate 
large systemic risk externalities (see, for instance, Perotti and Suarez, 2011). 
 
Given the relevance of liquidity strains as a contributing factor to systemic risk, the regulation of 
systemic risk could be strengthened by giving incentives to disclose contingent short-term 
liabilities, in particular those related to possible margin calls under credit default swap contracts 
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and repo funding. In non-tabulated results, our study also points to the role of large trading books 
as a source of systemic risk for those banks that were recapitalized during the crisis. As a result, 
the 2010 revamp of the Basel II capital framework to cover market risk associated with banks’ 
trading book positions will not only decrease individual risk but will also help to mitigate 
systemic risk. 
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Appendix A. List of Financial Institutions 
Country Bank Bloomberg Tickers 
Ticker 
    
AUSTRIA ERSTE GROUP BANK EBS AV ERS 
AUSTRALIA COMMONW BK AUSTR CBA AU CBAX 
 NATL AUST BANK NAB AU NABX 
 WESTPAC BANKING WBC AU WBCX 
BELGIUM KBC GROEP KBCB PZ KBC 
BRITAIN BARCLAYS PLC BARC LN BARC 
 HSBC HOLDINGS HSBC LN HSBC 
 LLOYDS BANKING LLOY LN LLOY 
 ROYAL BK SCOTLAND RBS LN RBS 
 STANDARD CHARTER STAN LN STAN 
CANADA BANK OF MONTREAL BMO CN BMO 
 BANK OF NOVA SCO BNS CT BNS 
 CAN IMPL BK COMM CM CT CM 
 ROYAL BANK OF CA RY CT RY 
 TORONTO-DOMINION BANK TD CT TD 
DENMARK DANSKE BANK A/S DANSKE DC DAB 
FRANCE BNP PARIBAS BNP FP BNP 
 SOC GENERALE GLE FP SGE 
GERMANY COMMERZBANK CBK GR CBK 
 DEUTSCHE BANK-RG DBK GR DBK 
IRELAND ALLIED IRISH BK ALBK ID ALBK 
ITALY BANCA MONTE DEI BMPS IM BMPS 
 INTESA SANPAOLO ISP IM BIN 
 UNICREDIT SPA UCG IM UC 
JAPAN DAIWA SECS GRP 8601 JT DS 
 NOMURA HOLDINGS 8604 JT NM 
NETHERLANDS ING GROEP NV-CVA INGA NA ING 
NORWAY DNB NOR ASA DNBNOR NO DNB 
SOUTH AFRICA STANDARD BANK GR SBK SJ SBKJ 
SPAIN BBVA BBVA SM BBVA 
 BANESTO SA BTO SM BTO 
 BANCO POPULAR POP SM POP 
 BANCO SANTANDER SAN SM SCH 
SWEDEN NORDEA BANK AB NDA SS NDA 
 SEB AB-A SEBA SS DEA 
 SVENSKA HAN-A SHBA SS SVK 
 SWEDBANK AB-A SWEDA SS SWED 
SWITZERLAND CREDIT SUISS-REG CSGN VX CSGN 
 UBS AG-REG UBSN VX UBS 
UNITED STATES BANK OF AMERICA BAC UN BAC 
 BB&T CORP BBT UN BBT 
 BANK NY MELLON BK UN BK 
 CITIGROUP INC C US C 
 CAPITAL ONE FINA COF UN COF 
 GOLDMAN SACHS GP GS UN GS 
 JPMORGAN CHASE JPM US JPM 
 MORGAN STANLEY MS UN MS 
 PNC FINANCIAL SE PNC UN PNC 
 REGIONS FINANCIA RF UN RF 
 SLM CORP SLM UN SLM 
 SUNTRUST BANKS STI UN STI 
 STATE ST CORP STT UN STT 
 US BANCORP USB US USB 
  WELLS FARGO & CO WFC UN WFC 
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Appendix B: List of recapitalizations 
 
Bank Date Recapitalization Policy
ERS Oct 30 2008 Injection of €2.7 bn of non-listed, non-voting, non-transferable capital 
KBC Oct 27 2008 Injection of €3.5 bn from the government, and €2.7 bn from the Flemish Regional Government 
BARC Sept 16 2009 Sale of $12 bn of risky credit assets to a special purpose vehicle  
Lloyds Sep 18 2008 Competition rules waived to allow the merger with HBOS 
  Oct 19 2008 The government injected £4 bn of preference shares 
RBS Jan 19 2009 The government swapped preferred shares for ordinary shares worth £5 bn 
  Feb 26 2009 The bank received £13 bn in additional capital for a participation fee of £6.5 bn 
  Nov 3 2009 The authorities announced an additional injection of £25.5 bn shoring up the gov stake to 84 % 
BNP Oct 22 2008 The bank issued hybrid subordinated debt for €2.55 bn 
  March 1 2009 The French banking plan purchased €5.1 bn of non-voting shares; hybrid debt was redeemed 
SGE Oct 22 2008 The bank issued hybrid subordinated debt for €1.7 bn 
CBK Nov 4 2008 The government announced an injection of  €8.2 bn with a further injection of €10 bn 
ALBK Feb 11 2009 Injection of €3.5 bn of tier I capital 
UC March 18 2009 The bank issued €4.0 bn of government capital instruments 
BIN March 20 2009 The bank announced the issuance of €4 bn of subordinated debt subscribed by the government 
BMPS March 27 2009 The bank announced the issuance of €1.9 bn of special bonds subscribed by the government 
ING Oct 21 2008 Government capital injection of €10 bn 
BAC Jan 16 2009 Capital injection of $20 bn from the TARP in exchange for preferred stock with 8% dividend 
C Nov 23 2008 Capital injection of $20 bn from the TARP in exchange for preferred stock with 8% dividend 
   Further issuance of $7 bn of preferred stock to the Treasury and the FDCI 
COF Oct 30 2008 Capital injection of $3.55 bn from the TARP in exchange for preferred stock with 8% dividend 
PNC Oct 30 2009 Capital injection of $7.6 bn from the TARP in exchange for preferred stock with 8% dividend 
WFC Oct 30 2010 Redemption of $25 bn issued to the governmetnt under the TARP 
Source: Bloomberg, authorities' websites, and IMF 
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Table 1. U.S. State Variables 
 
  CREDIT SPREAD CHANGE TBILL LIQ SPREAD S&P VIX 
YIELD 
SPREAD 
 Mean  0.004 -0.008  0.246  -0.020 21.827 0.004 
 Median -0.020  0.000  0.170    0.147 19.400 -0.010 
 Maximum  0.830  0.690  1.140  16.889 72.916 0.710 
 Minimum -0.580 -0.790 -0.040 -26.537 10.185 -0.554 
 Std. Dev.  0.154  0.118  0.223   2.964 10.579 0.161 
 Skewness  1.475 -1.212  1.731 -1.763 1.772 0.640 
 Kurtosis  9.200 15.083  5.984 22.104 7.008 5.331 
1st order autocorrelation  0.284  0.084  0.874 -0.150 0.972 -0.010 
 
Summary statistics of the U.S.weekly market variables: the credit spread is the difference between BAA rated bonds 
and the Treasury rate (with same maturity of 10 years). The change in TBILL is the change in the 3 month T-Bill rate. 
The liquidity spread is the difference between the 3-month repo rate and the 3-month T-Bill rate. The return variable is 
the weekly market equity return. The VIX is the CBOE option implied volatility. The yield spread is the change in the 
yield slope between the 10-year and the 3-month T-Bill rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Table 2. 1st-stage regressions: 1 Region 
 
 Baseline Asym. Asym. Ext. 
Constant 0.002 
(0.56) 
-0.002 
(-0.40) 
-0.002 
(-0.24) 
Volatility -0.001 
(-8.55) 
-0.001 
(-4.99) 
-0.001 
(-5.82) 
Liquidity Spread -0.026 
(-2.57) 
-0.007 
(-0.69) 
-0.002 
(-0.24) 
ΔTbill -0.114 
(-0.56) 
-0.006 
(-0.30) 
0.002 
(-1.41) 
ΔSlope 0.013 
(0.71) 
0.009 
(0.62) 
0.013 
(1.57) 
ΔCredit Spread -0.041 
(-1.95) 
-0.030 
(-1.44) 
-0.029 
(-3.65) 
Market Return 0.003 
(4.69) 
0.001 
(2.50) 
0.001 
(3.37) 
Crisis Dummy -0.011 
(-1.83) 
-0.006 
(-1.18) 
-0.005 
(1.65) 
1
i
tX   0.313 (5.73) - - 
 11 0itit XX I    -  
0.673 
(12.73) 
0.684 
(6.41) 
 11 0itit XX I    - 0.148 (2.35) 
0.156 
(2.68) 
 11 0,itit X CrisisX I    - - 0.082 (2.01) 
 11 0,Recapitit XX I    - - -0.143 (0.53) 
Pseudo-R2 0.406 0.477 0.489 
 
The table shows the median of estimated coefficients, t-statistics and pseudo-R2 in 1% quantile 
regressions on global system returns on a set of state variables (credit spread, change in the Treasury 
Bill, liquidity spread, volatility index, stock market return, yield spread and a dummy for the subsequent 
periods to the August 2007 credit crisis) and the returns of each bank. The baseline specification 
corresponds to the symmetric model presented in equation (5), whereas the asymmetric model is 
described in equation (7) and the asymmetric extended model is in equation (9). This table shows results 
for the model using U.S. state variables for all countries. These results are based on weekly data from the 
week of July 20, 2001 to the week of December 11, 2009. 
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Table 3a: Systemic Risk Sensitivity of each Bank 
 
Bank 
 
Xt<0 
 
Xt≥0 
 
(Xt<0)*Crisis
 
(Xt<0)*Recap 
 
Pseudo-R2 
 
BNS 1,199 0,298 0,083  0,448 
BAC 1,132 0,219 -0,641 -0,122 0,543 
HSBC 1,087 0,095 0,742  0,472 
WFC 1,058 0,030 -0,092 -0,540 0,513 
LLOY 1,058 0,011 -0,461 -0,329 0,489 
BBT 0,883 0,216 0,076  0,455 
SVK 0,861 0,269 0,044  0,523 
STI 0,858 0,166 -0,354  0,523 
CM 0,845 0,191 0,450  0,438 
USB 0,819 0,324 -0,053  0,480 
SCH 0,813 0,065 0,045  0,589 
TD 0,811 0,189 0,799  0,432 
UC 0,796 0,026 0,228 -0,594 0,558 
STT 0,795 0,019 -0,193  0,460 
C 0,791 0,066 0,082 -0,524 0,475 
ING 0,788 0,221 -0,036 -0,121 0,612 
UBS 0,774 -0,155 -0,174  0,497 
SWED 0,772 0,300 -0,183  0,557 
NDA 0,763 0,393 -0,010  0,575 
RF 0,757 0,069 -0,246  0,490 
DAB 0,756 0,242 -0,159  0,503 
BMPS 0,730 0,096 0,650 -0,726 0,529 
BBVA 0,711 0,086 0,191  0,588 
KBC 0,710 0,238 -0,232 -0,060 0,607 
DBK 0,707 0,016 0,039  0,606 
BNP 0,697 0,200 0,594 -0,375 0,625 
DEA 0,696 0,258 -0,053  0,552 
CSGN 0,671 0,257 -0,207  0,531 
SLM 0,668 0,120 -0,062  0,375 
POP 0,662 0,197 0,124  0,546 
BK 0,640 0,065 0,197  0,445 
BTO 0,634 0,309 0,195  0,456 
RBS 0,609 -0,004 -0,097 0,100 0,521 
CBK 0,599 0,050 0,216 -0,132 0,538 
BARC 0,569 0,108 -0,128 -0,338 0,490 
SGE 0,554 0,158 0,138 0,360 0,607 
CBAX 0,553 0,283 0,629  0,398 
WBCX 0,549 0,177 0,541  0,349 
ALBK 0,539 0,131 -0,140 -0,120 0,493 
RY 0,525 0,275 0,622  0,455 
PNC 0,513 0,072 1,404 -1,412 0,478 
STAN 0,508 0,161 0,499  0,492 
DNB 0,505 0,151 0,056  0,474 
MS 0,500 0,154 0,051  0,453 
BIN 0,441 0,037 0,582 0,286 0,488 
BMO 0,433 0,305 0,863  0,405 
JPM 0,410 0,100 -2,005  0,346 
SBKJ 0,404 0,123 0,602  0,440 
ERS 0,388 0,237 0,186 0,055 0,455 
GS 0,383 0,321 0,147  0,467 
COF 0,327 0,135 0,453 -0,154 0,478 
DS 0,250 0,097 0,472  0,352 
NM 0,219 0,087 0,496  0,322 
NABX 0,191 0,251 0,477  0,382 
 
This table shows the contribution to systemic risk of each bank in our sample. Banks are sorted by the asymmetric 
coefficient on negative bank returns in the most general model estimated (asset weighted system returns). 
 
Table 3b: Systemic Risk Contribution to Quarterly Asset Returns 
 
Overall Period    Pre-crisis Period   Crisis Period 
         Bank  ΔCoVaR    Bank ΔCoVaR Bank  ΔCoVaR
         
LLOY    ‐1.022    LLOY    ‐0,930    PNC   ‐2,173 
ING  ‐0.937    ING  ‐0,820    BMPS  ‐1,906 
CBK   ‐0.927    BAC   ‐0,800    STAN    ‐1,867 
BMPS   ‐0.910    CSGN   ‐0,674    CBK   ‐1,866 
SLM   ‐0.883    STT   ‐0,647    UC   ‐1,801 
HSBC   ‐0.856    SCH   ‐0,622    BIN   ‐1,728 
UC   ‐0.848    DBK   ‐0,622    SLM   ‐1,656 
BNP   ‐0.848    NDA   ‐0,621    HSBC   ‐1,654 
BAC   ‐0.823    KBC   ‐0,616    CM   ‐1,631 
BNS   ‐0.822    SLM   ‐0,608    TD   ‐1,600 
BBVA   ‐0.801    BMPS   ‐0,608    BNP   ‐1,596 
BBT   ‐0.796    C   ‐0,599    BBT   ‐1,527 
CM   ‐0.796    SVK   ‐0,597    WFC   ‐1,526 
PNC   ‐0.794    BNP   ‐0,592    BNS   ‐1,525 
SVK   ‐0.794    USB   ‐0,591    BBVA   ‐1,505 
STT   ‐0.792    CBK   ‐0,591    WBCX   ‐1,486 
DBK   ‐0.783    STI   ‐0,576    SGE   ‐1,475 
SCH   ‐0.777    UC   ‐0,569    CBAX   ‐1,450 
C   ‐0.776    DEA   ‐0,566    C   ‐1,422 
SWED   ‐0,769    SWED   ‐0,566    LLOY    ‐1,371 
BIN   ‐0,768    BNS   ‐0,565    SWED   ‐1,365 
WFC   ‐0,768    HSBC   ‐0,559    SVK   ‐1,361 
SGE   ‐0,755    BBVA   ‐0,557    RY   ‐1,338 
KBC   ‐0,755    WFC   ‐0,546    MS   ‐1,318 
TD   ‐0,752    BK   ‐0,533    COF   ‐1,302 
STAN    ‐0,747    BBT  ‐0,526 ING   ‐1,297
STI   ‐0,744    UBS  ‐0,524 BMO   ‐1,284
NDA   ‐0,743    BARC   ‐0,507    ALBK    ‐1,283 
DEA   ‐0,729    CM   ‐0,493    DBK   ‐1,261 
USB   ‐0,723    SGE   ‐0,487    RF   ‐1,251 
UBS   ‐0,701    RF   ‐0,471    SCH   ‐1,241 
BK   ‐0,684    ALBK    ‐0,462    UBS   ‐1,227 
RF   ‐0,682    TD   ‐0,455    STT   ‐1,221 
CSGN   ‐0,672    MS   ‐0,445    STI   ‐1,221 
ALBK    ‐0,661    DAB   ‐0,441    POP   ‐1,217 
MS   ‐0,655    DNB   ‐0,427    DEA   ‐1,212 
BARC   ‐0,634    RBS    ‐0,419    SBKJ   ‐1,197 
RBS    ‐0,615    BIN   ‐0,399    KBC   ‐1,175 
WBCX   ‐0,613    PNC   ‐0,389    ERS   ‐1,163 
COF   ‐0,609    STAN    ‐0,380    RBS    ‐1,136 
CBAX   ‐0,596    POP   ‐0,370    NDA   ‐1,135 
POP   ‐0,589    COF   ‐0,355    BK   ‐1,058 
DAB   ‐0,572    BTO   ‐0,345    USB   ‐1,030 
DNB   ‐0,569    GS   ‐0,343    BARC   ‐1,026 
RY   ‐0,546    ERS   ‐0,322    DNB   ‐0,993 
ERS   ‐0,544    WBCX   ‐0,306    BTO   ‐0,987 
BMO   ‐0,542    SBKJ   ‐0,297    BAC   ‐0,987 
SBKJ   ‐0,536    JPM    ‐0,293    NM   ‐0,934 
BTO   ‐0,508    DS   ‐0,283    DAB   ‐0,934 
GS   ‐0,474    CBAX   ‐0,276    DS   ‐0,925 
DS   ‐0,469    RY   ‐0,260    GS   ‐0,872 
NM   ‐0,421    BMO   ‐0,247    NABX   ‐0,776 
NABX   ‐0,282    NM  ‐0,212 CSGN   ‐0,741
JPM    ‐0,006    NABX   ‐0,103    JPM    0,792 
This table ranks the quarterly contribution to systemic risk of each individual bank. The overall period includes Q4-2001 to Q3-2009, 
the pre-crisis period covers Q4-2001 to Q2-2007, and the crisis period spans from Q3-2007 to Q1-2009. 
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Table 3c: Systemic Risk Contribution (Sensitivity) by Country 
 
Country Xt<0 Xt≥0 (Xt<0)*Crisis (Xt<0)*Recap Pseudo-R2 
 
Netherlands 0.788 0.220 -0.036  0.121 0.612 
Sweden 0.773 0.305 -0.050  0.552 
United Kingdom 0.766 0.074 0.111 -0.113 0.493 
Canada 0.763 0.252 0.564  0.435 
Denmark 0.756 0.242 -0.159  0.503 
Switzerland 0.723 0.051 -0.190  0.513 
Belgium 0.710  0.238 -0.232 -0.060 0.607 
Spain 0.705 0.164 0.139  0.544 
United States 0.702 0.138 -0.082 -0.183 0.466 
Italy 0.655 0.053 0.487 -0.345 0.525 
Germany 0.653 0.033 0.128 -0.066 0.572 
France 0.625 0.178 0.366 -0.007 0.616 
Ireland 0.539 0.131 -0.140 0.120 0.493 
Norway 0505 0.151 0.056  0.474 
Australia 0.430 0.237 0.549  0.376 
South Africa 0.404 0.123 0.602  0.440 
Austria 0.388 0.237 0.186 0.055 0.455 
Japan 0.234 0.092 0.484  0.337 
This table shows the average contribution to systemic risk of each country in our sample. Banks are sorted by the asymmetric 
coefficient on negative bank returns in the most general model estimated (asset weighted system returns). 
 
Table 3d: Systemic Risk Contribution to Quarterly Asset Returns 
 
Overall Period  Pre-crisis Period Crisis Period 
Country ΔCoVaR  Country ΔCoVaR Country ΔCoVaR 
Netherlands -0.937  Netherlands -0.820 Italy -1.812 
Germany -0.918  Switzerland -0.660 Germany -1.563 
Italy -0.883  United States -0.624 France -1.536 
France -0.836  Belgium -0.616 Canada -1.476 
Spain -0.797  Sweden -0.613 United Kingdom -1.411 
United States -0.788  Italy -0.601 Netherlands -1.297 
Belgium -0.755  France -0.591 Ireland -1.283 
Sweden -0.724  Germany -0.584 Sweden -1.268 
Switzerland -0.666  Spain -0.541 Australia -1.237 
Ireland -0.661  United Kingdom -0.484 Spain     -1.237 
United Kingdom -0.613  Ireland -0.462 South Africa     -1.197 
Australia -0.586  Denmark -0.441 United States -1.185 
Denmark -0.572  Norway -0.427 Belgium -1.175 
Norway -0.569  Austria -0.322 Austria -1.163 
Austria -0.544  South Africa -0.297 Norway -0.993 
South Africa -0.536  Japan -0.280 Switzerland -0.984 
Canada -0.506  Australia -0.261 Denmark -0.934 
Japan -0.444  Canada  0.187 Japan -0.929 
This table ranks the average quarterly contribution to systemic risk by country measured by the implied 
ΔCoVaR. The overall period includes Q4 2001 to Q3 2009, the pre-crisis period covers Q4 2001 to Q2 2007, 
and the crisis period spans from Q3 2007 to Q1 2009. 
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Table 4: Forecasting Systemic Risk 
 
 1-quarter 1-year 2-year 
 Estimation Method Estimation Method Estimation Method 
Independent Variables Panel One-way Panel One-way Panel One-way 
       
Constant -0.315*** -0.315*** -0.261*** -0.261 -0.784*** -0.784*** 
CoVaRit-k  0.724***  0.724***  0.620***  0.620***  0.009  0.009 
VaRit-k -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.051 -0.051 
Leverageit-k -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
WSFit-k -0.159** -0.159** -0.432*** -0.432** -0.432*** -0.432 
Sizeit-k -0.148 -0.148 -5.131*** -5.131** -3.198* -3.198 
MTBit-k  0.019*  0.019  0.014  0.014  0.009  0.009 
Mktbit-k  0.090  0.090 -0.030 -0.030 -0.262* -0.262 
Bank Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2 (%) 0.880 0.880  0.822 0.822 0.801 0.801 
Number of observations 1,378 1,378 1,229 1,229 1,031 1,031 
 
The table is based on all banks (firm-quarter observations) with data about marketable securities from 2001:Q4 until 
2009:Q3 from Bloomberg. The following equation is estimated: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1
6 7
1 1
it it k it k it k it k it k
n m
it k it k j j it
j j
CoVaR CoVaR VaR Leverage WSF Size
MTB Mktb Bank Time
     
  
    
 
 
 
        
      
where CoVaRit is the CoVaR of bank i at quarter t; CoVaRit-1is the CoVaR of bank i at quarter t-k; VaRit-k is the 
VaR of bank i at quarter t-k; Leverageit-k is the total assets to equity ratio of bank i at quarter t-k; WSFit-k is the short-term 
borrowings to total assets ratio of bank i at quarter t-k; Sizeit-k is the total assets of bank i at quarter t-k over the total assets 
of all banks in the sample at quarter t-k; MTBit-k is the Market-to-Book ratio of bank i at quarter t-k; Mktbit-k is the 
marketable securities to total assets ratio of bank i at quarter t-k; all right-hand-side variables are included with a lag of 
k=1 quarter, 1,2 years. Bankj are the n-1 bank dummies; Timej are the m-1 time dummies taking into account the year and 
quarter. The system is constructed using assets to compute the weights of each bank in the system. In the Panel column, 
the equation is estimated via firm and time fixed-effects panel data methodology. In the One-way column, the equation is 
estimated via Firm and Time fixed-effects one-way cluster methodology using banks as clusters. All CoVaRs are 
estimated using 1% percentile. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Forecasting Systemic Risk with an Extended Model  
 
 US EMU 
 Estimation Method Estimation Method 
Independent Variables Panel One-way Panel One-way 
     
Constant -0.134*** -0.134***  0.119*  0.119 
 CoVaRit-1  0.793***  0.793***  0.787***  0.787*** 
VaRit-1 -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.085*** -0.085*** 
Leverageit-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 
WSFit-1 -0.092** -0.092*  0.011  0.011 
Sizeit-1 -0.659 -0.659**  0.544  0.544 
MTBit-1  0.009  0.009 -0.003 -0.003 
Mktbit-1  0.072*  0.072*  0.016  0.016 
US -0.028** -0.028   
US *Leverageit-1 -0.659 -0.659   
US *WSFit-1  0.097  0.097   
US *Sizeit-1  1.840***  1.840   
EMU    0.037  0.037 
EMU *Leverageit-1    0.001  0.001 
EMU *WSFit-1   -0.169** -0.169** 
EMU *Sizeit-1   -1.482** -1.482* 
Bank Dummiesj No No No No
Time Dummiesk Yes Yes Yes Yes
     
R2 (%) 0.872 0.872 0.871 0.871 
Number of observations 1,378 1,378 1,378 1,378 
 
The table is based on all banks (firm-quarter observations) with data about marketable securities from 2001:Q4 
until 2009:Q3 from Bloomberg. The following equation is estimated: 
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   
  
 
where the right hand side variables are defined analogously to the table 4a and  the Ci variable stands for the USi 
/ EMUi, taking the value 1 if the bank is from the U.S. / European Monetary Union in each regression. In the 
Panel column, the equation is estimated via firm and time fixed-effects panel data methodology. In the One-way 
column, the equation is estimated via Firm and Time fixed-effects one-way cluster methodology using banks as 
clusters. All CoVaRs are estimated using percentile 1%. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** 
Significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1: Difference between the estimates of the δ– and δ+ parameters in the asymmetric 
systemic risk model 
 
This Figure plots the difference between δ–and δ+ in the 1st stage systemic risk model (equation 9) as a function 
of the coefficient size on individual banks negative returns reported in Table 3a. The numbers in the x-axis are 
associated with the ranking in that table (for instance 1 is BNS –with the highest δ– coefficient, and 10 is HSBC) 
whereas the y-axis shows the difference between the δ–and δ+ estimates (asymmetry). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
